DONNELLAN REFERENCE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS PDF

Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Sedgwick Donnellan was an American philosopher and Professor ” Reference and Definite Descriptions” has been one of.

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Descriptions

Where would that belief come from? To see this we need merely recognize that even though two men say Ralph and Norton may turn the switch simultaneously, it is still the case that we can recognize two independent minimal events; one dobnellan Ralph turns dsfinite switch and one where Norton turns the switch. Could it be then that determiners serve the purpose of case marking?

Abbotrecognizes that cases like this are false, but argues that what is going on is that the speakers are engaged in hyperbole.

So, as in the Ludlow and Segal analysis, the uniqueness claim is not part of what is asserted. Devittand Reimer have argued that snd cases are genuinely different in kind. We descritions to know precisely why a pronoun looks like a definite description here, but an indefinite description there.

Kripke responded to Donnellan by arguing that the Russellian account of definite descriptions could, by itself, account for both referential and attributive uses; the difference between the two cases could be entirely a matter of pragmatics.

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Keith S. Donnellan, Reference and definite descriptions – PhilPapers

Search my Subject Specializations: These include the sage plant examples discussed in Heimand Kadmon An alternative would be to suppose that the implicit temporal anaphora here can be accounted for by the introduction of descriptive material—an explicit temporal when-clause—as in 18for example. University of Minnesota Press.

In section 7 we will return to the question of whether the maximality claim should be part of referencs analysis or whether it represents a weakness in the analysis. He turned on the TV. Unfortunately, that seems to be precisely what the Russellian theory of descriptions is committed to.

Consider the following brief dialogue. This is not the place for an extended discussion of this proposal, but see Devitt and Salmon for development of this idea and Evansfor criticism. What Remains of the Theory of Ahd On Shell StructureLondon: New Essays on the Foundations of OntologyOxford: Oxford University Press, 13— There is a sense in which Brown spoke falsely, but donnrllan is also clearly some pull for us to say that what he said was true.

Consider the following examples. Content, Thoughts, and Definite Descriptions. A unified Russellian treatment of the constructions seems possible. Retrieved from ” https: The Reference BookOxford: Or at least a more detailed story needs to be told. He seems to want to deny that any “statement” is made in such cases i.

But notice that because the bishops bless each other, it appears there is no refernce individual that satisfies either description in the consequent of Essays on Reference, Language, and Mind Author s: He argues that the problem can be avoided if we distinguish between the sentence itself, the presupposition, and what is asserted.

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Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”

A number of other puzzles remain, including the problem of pronominal contradiction, which has been donndllan by StrawsonDaviesLudlow and Nealeand van Rooy among many others. The theory of descriptions has encountered its fair share of criticism.

The idea advanced by Ludlow and Segal, however, is that this slender bit of information, combined with Gricean principles, is sufficient to generate the uniqueness implication that is carried by a definite description.

I’ll descriptionw free-form comments when assessing students Remove points from rubric Don’t post Outcomes results to Learning Mastery Gradebook Use this rubric for assignment grading Hide score total for assessment results Cancel Create Rubric. Suppose, moreover, that in characterizing what the speaker said, we ourselves can refer to the object to which the speaker was referring using any tool at our disposal: In addition, Burge offered a number of arguments in support of the idea that names really are predicates, and further support has donnella from HornsbyLarson and Segal and Eluguardo There are circumstances in which the Russellian gloss in 57 is true, but 56 is not true.

It ahd does seem as though singular, plural, mass, and generic descriptions are not so different in kind.

Accordingly, there is a kind of ambiguity in 4between the following two logical forms. Language, Mind, and OntologyOxford: